观韬解读 | 再谈“IEEPA关税案”——从解读联邦最高法院裁决的角度（上）

观韬国际贸易与WTO业务委员会、观韬金融保险及衍生业务委员会联合供稿

作者：尹颖

Learning Resources, Inc. 诉特朗普案（关税）（24-1287）与特朗普诉 V.O.S. Selections 案（25-250）合并审理，即“IEEPA关税案”。从当地时间2026年2月20日美国联邦最高法院作出裁决至今，围绕该案裁决执行的相关工作依旧在继续推进，而该案裁决本身也仍然是热议的话题。本文即为对该案裁决的解读。

中文译文：

第一部分 案情、程序背景及争议焦点

A. 案情

1977年颁布的《国际紧急经济权力法》（IEEPA）赋予美国总统应对重大外部威胁的经济手段。 根据IEEPA采取行动时，美国总统必须认定存在主要源自美国境外的、对美国国家安全、外交政策或经济构成异常且非凡的威胁；必须依据《国家紧急状态法》宣布进入国家紧急状态；随后方可通过指令、许可或其他方式采取指定措施应对该威胁。

2025年，特朗普总统试图应对两项外来威胁。第一项是来自加拿大、墨西哥和中国的非法毒品涌入；第二项是“巨大且持续”的贸易逆差。美国总统认定，第一项威胁已“引发公共卫生危机”，而第二项威胁则“导致美国制造业基础空心化”并“破坏了关键供应链”。

特朗普总统认为这两项威胁均属异常且极其严重，遂针对这两项威胁宣布进入国家紧急状态。随后，他分别征收关税以应对这两项威胁，即打击毒品走私的关税和对等关税。自征收这两套关税以来，总统已多次发布关税上调、下调及其他调整措施。

B. 诉讼经过

由两家小型企业组成的“Learning Resources”原告方，以及由五家小型企业和12个州组成的“The V.O.S. Selections”原告方，虽在不同法院提起诉讼，但主张相同。他们主张，IEEPA并未授权征收对等关税或毒品走私关税。

“Learning Resources”案由原告向哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院提起诉讼，政府随后申请将案件移交至国际贸易法院（CIT），理由是地区法院缺乏管辖权，而国际贸易法院拥有专属管辖权。地区法院驳回了该动议，并批准了原告提出的初步禁令动议，认定IEEPA未授予总统征收关税的权力。

V.O.S. Selections向国际贸易法院提起诉讼，该法院批准了原告提出的即决判决动议。联邦巡回上诉法院全体法官合议后认定，国际贸易法院对此案拥有专属管辖权，并赞同该法院关于IEEPA未授权实施被质疑关税的裁决。

政府在V.O.S. Selections案中提出了加速审理动议和调卷令申请，而Learning Resources案的原告则在判决前提出了调卷令申请。

最高法院批准了上述动议和申请，并将这两起案件合并审理。

C. 争议焦点

IEEPA是否授权总统征收关税？

第二部分 裁决与理由

A. 征税权的独特重要性

法院首先讨论了征税权的独特重要性。

《宪法》第一条第八款规定了立法机构的权力。该款第一项明确规定：“国会应有权征收和收取税收、关税、进口税和消费税。” 法院研读了《联邦党人文集》第33篇，参考了其中亚历山大·汉密尔顿关于征税权重要性的论述。不仅如此，征税权既是一种具有毁灭性的权力，也是国家存续与繁荣所必需的权力。

此外，法院还阐述了关税与税收之间的关系，以及征收关税的权力与征税权力之间的关系。很明显，关税是对进口货物和服务征收的一种税，征收关税的权力是征税权的一个分支。法院指出，关税的功能是筹集财政收入；正如《联邦党人文集》第12篇所述，制宪者曾预期政府在很长一段时间内将主要依靠关税作为财政收入来源。

B. 行政部门未被授予征税权

《宪法》第一条第七款第一项规定：“所有关于征收税收的法案均应由众议院提出。”基于征税权的独特重要性及其历史背景，并结合《联邦党人文集》第58篇中的阐释，法院得出结论：只有国会才被赋予动用人民财力的权力，而制宪者并未将征税权的任何部分授予行政部门。

C. 非国家紧急状态；无论是否处于国家紧急状态，均不得将国会征收关税的权力予以授权

政府承认，总统在和平时期并不享有征收关税的固有权力，且完全依赖IEEPA。政府将“监管……进口”解读为对国会制定关税政策权力的广泛授权，从而授权总统对来自任何国家的任何产品征收金额和期限均不受限制的关税。

1. “广泛授权”

(1) 适用“重大问题原则”时，语境要求持怀疑态度

法院在讨论此问题时适用“重大问题原则”。该原则始于2000年，并于2022年进行了重新构想和强化。法院解释称，其创立并修改该原则旨在解决“一个特定且反复出现的问题：行政机构主张其拥有超出国会合理授权范围的、影响深远的权力。”参见《西弗吉尼亚州诉美国环保署案》（2022年）。根据该原则，在对国民经济至关重要的案件中，法院将拒绝采纳行政机构对模棱两可的法定语言所作的解释。

在法院所称的每一宗“重大问题”案件中，政府均以不明确的法律依据为由，主张拥有广泛而宽泛的权力。在此类案件中，即使法律条文的字面意思或许可以被解读为授权了所主张的权力，但结合上下文来看，仍应持怀疑态度。该上下文包括法律条文中的其他表述、宪法结构以及常识。

无论是三权分立原则，还是对立法意图的实际理解，都表明国会不会通过模棱两可的措辞来授权具有重大影响的权力。

实际上，当国会授权其关税权力时，总是采用明确的措辞，并设定严格的限制，例如设定金额上限、规定临时期限，以及将行使关税权力附条件于满足严格的程序性先决条件等。相比之下，政府却将IEEPA解读为赋予总统单方面征收无限制关税的权力。然而事实是，在IEEPA实施的半个世纪里，没有任何一位总统援引该法征收过任何关税。在本案中，自征收毒品走私关税和对等关税以来，总统已多次发布关税上调、下调及其他调整措施，这表明每一套关税都是单方面的且无限制的。

(2) “重大问题原则”适用于紧急状态

政府主张该原则不应适用于紧急状态。最高法院驳回了这一主张。紧急状态可能为篡夺国会权力提供现成的借口。当国会有所担忧其权力遭到篡夺时，最高法院则完全有理由期待国会使用明确的措辞来实施无限制的授权——特别是对其一项重要权力的授权。

(3) 外交事务例外不适用

诚然，一般而言，即使没有国会的授权，总统在外交事务上也享有某些独立的宪法权力。但在关税问题上，这种观点却难以成立，因为尽管关税显然涉及外交事务，但征税权仅授予国会。此外，最高法院不会预期国会通过模糊的措辞，或在缺乏谨慎限制的情况下，放弃其关税权力。

(4) “重大问题”原则不存在“重大问题例外”

最高法院驳回了以下主张：即在涉及“最重大的重大问题”的法规中，模棱两可的授权条款必然应作广义解释。此外，最高法院对那些声称模棱两可的法规文本中暗藏广泛授权——特别是涉及国会核心权力的授权——的主张保持警惕。

因此，总统必须指出明确的国会授权，以证明其行使征收关税这一非常规权力的正当性。但他没能做到。

（待续）

***

英文原文

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (Tariffs) (24-1287)

Consolidated with Trump v. V.O.S. Selections (25-250)

Part I  Facts, Procedural History, and Issue

A. Facts

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which was enacted in 1977, gives the President economic tools to address significant foreign threats.  To act under IEEPA, the President must identify an unusual and extraordinary threat the American national security, foreign policy, or the economy, originating primarily outside the United States;[1] must declare a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act;[2] and may then, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise, take the specified actions to deal with the threat.[3]  

In 2025, President Trump sought to address two foreign threats. The first was the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China. The second was “large and persistent” trade deficits. The President determined that the first threat had “created a public health crisis,” and that the second had “led to the hollowing out” of the American manufacturing base and “undermined critical supply chains.”

President Trump deemed both threats to be unusual and extraordinary, declared a national emergency as to both threats. Then, he imposed tariffs to deal with each threat, i.e., the drug trafficking tariffs, and the reciprocal tariffs. Since imposing each set of tariffs, the President has issued several increases, reductions, and other modifications.

B. Procedural history

The Learning Resources plaintiffs, which consist of two small businesses, and The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs, which consist of five small businesses and 12 States, filed suits in different court but alleged the same. They alleged that IEEPA does not authorize either reciprocal or drug trafficking tariffs.

Learning Resources sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Government moved to transfer the case to the CIT, arguing that the District Court lacked JD while CIT has the exclusive JD. The District Court denied that motion and granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that IEEPA did not grant the President the power to impose tariffs.

V.O.S. Selections filed suit in the CIT, and the CIT granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that the CIT has exclusive JD and agreed with the CIT that IEEPA did not authorize the challenged tariffs.

The Government filed a motion to expedite and a petition for certiorari in V.O.S. Selections, and the Learning Resources plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari before judgment.

The Supreme Court granted the motion and petition and consolidated these two cases.

C. Issue

Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs?

Part II. Decision and Rationale

A. The Unique Importance of the Taxing Power

The Court first discussed the unique importance of the taxing power.

Article I, Section 8 set forth the power of the Legislative Branch. The first Clause of this section specifies that “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”  The Court read The Federalist No. 33 and got Alexander Hamilton’s explanation about the importance of the power to tax.[4] Moreover, the taxing power is both a power to destroy and a power necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation.[5]

Further, the Court described the relationship between tariff and tax as well as relationship between the power to impose tariffs and the power to tax. Very clearly, a tariff is a tax levied on imported goods and services, the power to impose tariffs is a branch of the taxing power.[6] The Court pointed out that the function of tariffs is raising revenue[7],  as read The Federalist No. 12, the Framers expected that the Government would for a long time depend chiefly on tariffs for revenue.

B. No Taxing Power Vested in the Executive Branch

Article I., Section 7, Clause 1, of the Constitution requires that “All Bills for raising Revenue [to] originate in the House of Representatives.”  Based on the said unique importance of the taxing power and history, together with the explanation from The Federalist No. 58, the Court concluded that Congress was given alone access to the pockets of the people, and the Framers did not vest any part of the taxing power in the Executive Branch.

C. Not a National Emergency, No Delegation of Congress’s Power to Impose Tariff Regardless of Whether In a National Emergency

The Government concedes that the President enjoys no inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime, and relies exclusively on IEEPA.  It reads the words “regulate” and “importation” to effect a sweeping delegation of Congress’s power to set tariff policy authorizing the President to impose tariffs of unlimited amount and duration, on any product from any country.

1. “Sweeping delegation”

(1) Context counseled skepticism when applying the major questions doctrine

The Court applies the major question doctrine in the discussion about this regard.  The major questions doctrine was created beginning in 2000, and was reimagined and toughened in 2022. The Court explained that it had created and modified this doctrine to address “a particular and recurring problem: agencies asserting highly consequential power beyond what Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted.” West Virginia v. EPA (2022). Pursuant to this doctrine, the Court would refuse to defer to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language in cases that were too important to the national economy.

In each case which was described by the Court as “major questions” case, the Government claimed broad, expansive power on an uncertain statutory basis. In such a case, even if the statutory text might have been read to delegate the asserted power, context counseled skepticism.  The context included other languages within the statute, constitutional structure, and common sense.

Both separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent suggested Congress would not have delegated highly consequential power through ambiguous language.

In practice, when Congress has delegated its tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits, e.g., capped amount, temporary duration, conditioned exercise of the tariff power on demanding procedural prerequisites, etc. By contrast, the Government reads IEEPA to give the President power to unilaterally impose unbounded tariffs. However, the fact is that in IEEPA’s half century of existence, no President has invoked the statute to impose any tariffs. In this case, since imposing the drug trafficking tariffs and reciprocal tariffs, the President has issued several increases, reductions, and other modifications, demonstrating that each set of tariffs is unilateral and unbounded. 

(2) The major questions doctrine applies to emergency statutes

The Government argues that the doctrine should not apply to emergency statutes. The Court rejected this argument. Emergencies can afford a ready pretext for usurpation of congressional power.[8] Where Congress has reason to be worried about the usurpation of its powers, the Court in turn have every reason to expect Congress to use clear language to effectuate unbounded delegations— particularly of its one great power.

(3) Foreign affairs exception does not apply

Indeed, as a general matter, the President enjoys some independent constitutional powers over foreign affairs even without congressional authorization. But it makes little sense when it comes to tariffs as Congress was given alone the power to tax notwithstanding the obvious foreign affairs implication of tariffs. Moreover, the Court would not expect Congress to relinquish its tariff power through vague language, or without careful limits.

(4) No major questions exception to the major questions doctrine

The Court rejected the argument that ambiguous delegations in statutes addressing the most major of major questions” should necessarily be construed broadly. Further, the Court alert to claims that sweeping delegations—particularly delegations of core congressional powers— lurk in ambiguous statutory text.

Accordingly, the President must point to clear congressional authorization to justify his extraordinary assertion of the power to impose tariffs. But he cannot.

(To be continued)

[1] 50 U. S. C. §1701(a)

[2] Ibid.

[3] §§1701(a), 1702(a)(1)(B)

[4] The Federalist No. 33, pp. 202–203 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

[5] McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 515 (1899).

[6] Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 201 (1824); Congressional Research Service (CRS), C. Casey, U. S. Tariff Policy: Overview 1 (2025).

[7] West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 193 (1994)

[8] Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S., at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring)